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On 11 September 2001, terrorists, in hijacked commercial aircraft, smashed into the World
Trade Center complex in New York City. Nearly three thousand people died as a result of this
action. The President of the United States, along with his National Security Advisor, Director of
Central Intelligence, and Attorney General were quick to go before the American people and
condemn this act of treachery. Calls for justice were quick and many, and the American people
came together in a chorus of condemnation of those responsible. On 11 September 1973, the
President of the United States, along with his National Security Advisor, Director of Central
Intelligence, and Attorney General, helped facilitate the rise to power of General Augusto
Pinochet as the new President of Chile. It is estimated that 2,800-5,000 people died as a result of
this action. There was no condemnation for this act of treachery. In fact the American public
was unaware of the actions of the United States Government so there was never a cry for justice.
The actions of the United States government would become public knowledge twenty-six years
later.
In February 1999, President William J. Clinton declassified the documents associated with the
operation that put Pinochet into power, and the public slowly started to become aware of what
our government had done. This CIA operation, code named FUBELT, was put into action
despite the fact that President Salvador Allende posed no threat to the United States. These
documents, many of which are cited herein, show a blatant disregard of the United States
government's own ideology and policies regarding democracy, as well as its disregard of the
United Nations (U.N.) documents that it signed to guarantee a right of self determination. The
disregard of these rights that the United States has agreed to under the U.N. charter and the rights
to a free and democratic society as guaranteed by our own Constitution are the heart of the
hypocrisy of United States foreign policy. There are many examples of this hypocrisy in foreign
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policy, in numerous countries in virtually every region of the world. This paper will look at just
one of those examples, the United States involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador
Allende of Chile.1
On the 26th of June, 1945 the United States signed the United Nations charter. Chapter 1,
Article 1, paragraph 2 states clearly the following rationale for the organizations existence, and
commits the signatories: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace."2 The right to self-determination was one of the
founding principles of the United States' War of Independence as well as the nation's
Constitution. Why would the United States undertake an operation that goes against these very
principles? What had Allende done that made him a target of the United States?
The actions that President Richard Nixon and his administration took against Salvador
Allende and Chile were directly related to, or derived from, policies and actions of his
predecessors. To understand the how and why of the United States involvement in Chile, we
must look at those actions and policies undertaken by the Presidents of the containment
generation. The Cold War, and the policies that arose from it, shaped United States foreign
policy immediately following World War II, and for decades thereafter. As the war came to a
close, two powers stood at polar ends of the political spectrum: the United States and the Soviet
Union. Having seen the Soviet Union take control of Eastern Europe, the fear of future
Communist expansion became the impetus for "containment" of communism, and the domino
theory as the basis of United States foreign policy for the next quarter century. President Truman
became the first of the containment generation Presidents. His containment policies included
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The Truman Doctrine, The Marshall Plan, and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.3
In October of 1949 the Chinese Revolution put Mao Zedong into power and created a
Communist China. This was seen as a serious setback to the United States foreign policy of
containment and left Truman with the label of the President who "lost" China.
In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President. Stopping the spread of
communism, and containing the Communist desire for world supremacy remained the top
priority for American foreign policy.4 Under Eisenhower's New Look policy, the United States
would take any actions it deemed necessary in order to keep the current balance of power in its
favor. It was during the Eisenhower administration that the CIA became a major player in
United States foreign policy. This administration and those that followed initiated covert
operations into foreign territories through the CIA. In 1959, at the end of Eisenhower's
presidency, the Cuban Revolution took place and had a profound effect on the entire Latin
American region.
The effects of the recent Cuban Revolution swept through virtually all Latin American
countries, and was something that the new administration under John F. Kennedy had to deal
with.5 Because of its impact, the Cuban Revolution played a key role in determining future
American foreign policy responses in Latin America. Cuba and Latin America became the
impetus for many of the programs and policies under Kennedy, policies that allowed the
containment and the domino theories to obtained new heights. Kennedy did not want to be seen
as weak on communism, or to become the next President to lose a country to the perceived threat
of Communist expansion. Under President Kennedy, the policy of "flexible response" replaced
Eisenhower's New Look policy. Flexible response expanded the conventional military forces
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greatly, and placed special emphasis on the establishment of special forces units such as the
Green Berets.6 According to Fraser and Murray the last policy in the containment of Communist
expansion, especially in Latin America, was "United States support for anti-Communist forces
plotting to overthrow actual pro- or suspected Communist governments in Central and South
America."7 This policy became the key to President Richard Nixon's response to the election of
Salvador Allende in Chile.
Who was Salvador Allende and how did he become the target of the Nixon administration?
Salvador Allende Gossens was born in Valparaíso, Chile on 26 June 1908. His family was
considered upper class and had a history of being involved in politics. In 1932 Allende
graduated from the University of Chile with a degree in medicine. It was during his college
years, while working part time with the ambulance service, that Allende would witness the
effects of deep impoverishment and illiteracy in Chile. His desire to help the poor and his social
conscience pushed him into politics and made him the Marxist he became.8 In 1956 Allende's
coalition became the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), and in 1958 he served as the party's
candidate for the presidency. Allende did much better in the 1958 election than he had in the
previous Presidential election, receiving 29 percent of the popular vote versus 6 percent in 1952.
Because of his narrow defeat and his Marxist ideology, Allende attracted a lot of attention
amongst officials in Washington D.C.. In 1964 Allende ran once more for President. Unlike the
previous elections in which three or more candidates had run, the 1964 election saw only Allende
and Eduardo Frei running against each other. Allende represented the left and was again the
candidate of FRAP. Frei represented the center and right and was the candidate of the Christian
Democrats. Conservatives and liberals that were allied with the radical elements of the right had
no desire to see a Marxist candidate in power. To eliminate this possibility they broke away
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from their alliance and allowed their supporters to vote for Frei. With a Marxist candidate on one
hand and a democratic candidate on the other, the United States could not let Allende win. The
Johnson administration tasked the CIA with helping the Frei campaign. To accomplish the
mission, the CIA covertly contributed millions in financial support to Frei's campaign. Frei went
on to win the election. This marked the first time-certainly not the last-that the United States
involved itself in an Allende related election. In 1970, Salvador Allende ran for President again,
this time for his own Unidad Popular (People's Unity) coalition. The 1970 election was a return
to a three candidate election and Allende won this election but not with a clear majority. Allende
received 36.5 percent of the vote, Jorge Allesandri got 35.2 percent and the third candidate
Radomiro Tomic received 28.0 percent. Under the Chilean Constitution, if no candidate receives
a majority, congress would choose the winner of the election. This set in motion the events that
led to the overthrow of Allende and demonstrated, once again, the hypocrisy of American
foreign policy.
To say that the United States was the sole contributing element that led to the overthrow of
Allende would be inaccurate. Salvador Allende's political ambitions, as well as his actions, or in
some cases his inaction, were all contributing factors to his own downfall. Historian Thomas
Wright points out several of Allende's contributory actions and non-action. First was the hyper
mobilization of rural and working classes. This created significant problems for Allende as rural
peasants had taken Allende's agrarian reform into their own hands to occupy large estates and
urban workers had taken action as well by seizing factories. The problem for Allende was a
question of what or what not to do about it. Allende waivered on action against his own people
as his government was a peoples government. On the other side of the fence Allende believed
that he needed to enforce the laws of the land. Wright says, "On one hand Allende had
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Constitutional responsibility as President to enforce the law, which of course guaranteed private
ownership rights until valid expropriation order was given. On the other hand the workers were
Allende’s constituency, and for ideological as well as practical reasons he was understandably
loathe to use force of a "people's" government against the people."9 Secondly there existed a
power struggle between the President and congress as congressional impeachments of Allende
appointed cabinet ministers took place. Chile's congress and judiciary branch had no sympathy
for Allende's Marxist objectives and showed this by refusing to pass bills brought forth by his
UP coalition. Thirdly there were mounting economic problems such as shortages of food and
other consumer goods and inflation that reached 300 percent. These economic problems were
exacerbated by Track II operations. Chile's radical left wing, the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR), continued to radicalize and mobilize the lower classes. Furthermore
the MIR wanted, and advocated in actions, Allende to take bigger and bolder steps. As Allende
continued to nationalize the Chilean economy and the United States economic warfare took its
toll, the support of the middle class was fading away. The gremios, Chile’s economic and
profession associations, launched the 1972 truckers strike to protest nationalization of the
trucking sector that shutdown the provisioning to cities. In addition, a second strike on July 25,
1973, was designed to totally shut down the economy for as long as necessary to remove
Allende. Both strikes were supported financially by the CIA as part of its covert destabilization
plan. Joining the gremios were Chilean housewives in the "marches of the empty pots",
demonstrations by students and general street agitation. Along with all the violence, economic
warfare, and a political impasse, the MIR and Allende's last move brought the coup climate to
critical mass and provide the impetus for the Chilean military to move against Allende.
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Chilean Naval intelligence had uncovered a plot that sailors in two cities were planning to
mutiny against their commanders. With this information they accused the MIR, Socialist
Senator Carlos Altamirano and the Movement for Unitary Popular Action Deputy Oscar
Garretón with plotting the mutiny. Allende's last move, unfortunately, coincided with the
"discovery" of the mutiny plot. Allende decided to replace officers in various strategic positions
within the Chilean military with officers that he was confident in. Prior to this action, Allende
had taken a hands off approach with the military. This would be the first time that he would use
his powers as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.
Scholarship written in the first few years after the coup are good sources on events within
Chile. During this period the most influential scholars in the field included Paul Sigmund,
Elizabeth Farnsworth, James Petras and Morley Morris, The documents released in 1999
changed the accuracy and scope of many of these secondary sources.10 For the purpose of this
paper, I have primarily utilized secondary sources written after President Clinton's release of the
Chilean documents. Influential authors from this period include Peter Kornbluh, Lubna Zakia
Qureshi, and Thomas Wright.
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, superpower one-upmanship, domino theory, and
Communist containment polices of the four preceding administrations, the Nixon administration
had to deal with the election of an openly Marxist President and a Marxist-oriented government
in Chile. President Richard Nixon was not going to let another Cuba happen in Latin America.
Qureshi summed it up well when she stated that President Nixon was "shaped by cultural
prejudice and influence by the legacy of his predecessors" and that he "looked on political
developments in Chile with proprietary interest."11 As mentioned earlier the actions that
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President Richard Nixon and his administration took against Salvador Allende and Chile were
directly related to, or derived from, policies and actions of his predecessors.
The democratically elected Chilean President, Marxist Salvador Allende, took office on 3
November 1970. Despite the fact that the United States Government intelligence and diplomatic
assessments had determined that Allende posed no threat to the security of the United States,
nothing would stop the Nixon administration from being the force behind the efforts to try to
keep him from being seated as the new President, or his subsequent removal from office if
inaugurated.
On 15 September 1970, President Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger,
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell met
in the Oval Office, to discuss United States policy toward Allende and Chile. It was reported
that President Nixon was very angry and was concerned that if Allende became the new Chilean
President that communism would spread throughout Latin America. Qureshi theorizes that,
"What probably intensified his paranoia about Allende's Unidad Popular and other Latin
American nationalist movements was the most successful one of all, Castro's Cuban
experiment."12 During this meeting Nixon stressed that he wanted to prevent Allende from being
inaugurated. Handwritten notes taken by DCI Helms showed the beginning of United States
intervention into Chilean internal affairs. The handwritten notes from this meeting became the
Presidential directive regarding actions to be undertaken in Chile. The notes provide insight to
President Nixon and his disregard for Chilean sovereignty.
The notes state:
One in 10 chance, perhaps,
but save Chile:
Worth Spending
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Not concerned risks involved
No involvement of Embassy
$10,000,000 available, more
if necessary
full-time job-best men
we have
game plan
make the economy scream
48 hours plan of action13
The next day, 16 September 1970, DCI Helms met with high agency officials of covert
operations to discuss options. Minutes of this first meeting note that the CIA must prepare an
action plan for National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger within 48 hours.
“The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende
Regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States. The President
asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him.
The President authorized ten million dollars for this purpose, if needed. Further
The Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments
Of State and Defense.”14
Here we see written documentation of President Nixon's disregard of our own government's
ideology and policies regarding democracy, as well as the U.N. documents that it signed to
guarantee a right of self determination. Proof that United States foreign policy is hypocritical
and is meant as a tool for the United States to get its way through intervention. The CIA Plan
that evolved out of this meeting was one that consisted of dual actions, known as Track I and
Track II, both running concurrently. This plan was given the codename FUBELT. Kissinger
and the CIA immediately implemented FUBELT in order to comply with the directive of the
President. Oversight of the operation was handled through the 40 Committee. The 40
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Committee supervised all intelligence operations that were undertaken on behalf of the White
House.
Track I is said to have originated on June 18, 1970 when Ambassador Edward Korry
proposed to the 40 Committee that a contingency fund of $250,000 be established in order to
bribe Chilean congressmen and senators, in the event that neither candidate received a majority.
Under the Chilean Constitution, if no candidate receives a majority of the popular vote, then
congress must select the winner of the election. This was the case, as Allende received 36.5% of
the vote, Jorge Alessandri 35.2% and Radomiro Tomic 28%.15 Allende’s party did not have the
congressional votes to put him in power, without a minimum of 19 votes from the Christian
Democratic Party. To insure that Allende would not win, bribery of the Christian Democrat
members of congress would be a way to keep Allende out of power. The ultimate goal of this
covert political maneuver was for the Chilean congress to ratify the runner-up candidate, Jorge
Alessandri. After Alessandri's ratification, the plan called for him to then renounce the
presidency and create the need for a new election. The outgoing Christian Democratic President
Eduardo Frei could run again, and with United States assistance like the 1964 elections, defeat
Allende. This was the initial plan that the CIA called Track I or the parliamentary solution.
Track I was considered and generally accepted to be a legal and Constitutional approach to
keeping Allende from assuming the presidency. On September 14, the 40 committee authorized
expenditure of this fund. It quickly became apparent that bribery was too risky due to the
number of officials needing to be bribed. With such large numbers the chances of exposure were
high. If the plan were exposed, the anti-American sentiment that it would create within Chile
could cause the collapse of the entire effort.16
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The plan to bribe members of the Chilean congress was abandoned but covert efforts to
pressure the military and the Christian Democrats to accept and enact the “Frei re-election
gambit” continued. When it was realized that there was no way to get enough of the Christian
Democrats votes to ratify Alessandri this plan was also abandoned. Nixon knew that direct
military intervention would lead to world condemnation and serious repercussions in the U.N. so
he continued to push the CIA to come up with a covert plan to keep Allende from being ratified
as the winner of the election. The new plan called for current President Eduardo Frei to institute
a self coup. Under the plan Frei would order his cabinet to resign and replace them with a
cabinet composed entirely of military officers. After this, Frei would appoint an acting President
and then leave Chile. This would leave the country under the control of the military, and a
Presidential figurehead. The problem with the Frei self coup plan was that it depended on Frei’s
total commitment to execute the plan to completion. Frei's objection to betraying both the
Constitution and Chile's historical tradition of non military intervention in civil rule led to the
failure of Track I.17
Efforts to get Frei to set the coup plan in motion continued. These efforts included false
newspaper articles claiming the Communists were out to destroy Frei and his legacy as soon as
Allende assumed power. Other efforts included telegrams to Frei's wife, from fake women's
groups, asking her to save the region from communism. The work that went into trying to keep
Allende from being elected, and then inaugurated was nothing when compared to the efforts of
the CIA during the 1958 elections. Many historians feel that there is a distinction between Track
I and Track II. The distinction that Track I was a Constitutional approach and that Track II was a
military coup is erroneous. As seen by the CIA's plan involving Eduardo Frei, Track I changed
its focus from one of a constitutional approach to one of a coup. Track II focused on the Chilean
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military, in regards to identifying any current or retired officers willing to lead a coup against the
Allende government. Furthermore, any assistance that the United States can provide, to include,
money, equipment, and direction would be available. CIA efforts to keep Allende from assuming
office did not succeed. This did not stop the Nixon administration from continuing to make
plans for his eventual overthrow.
Allende was ratified as President on 24 October 1970. Per Nixon's orders, the CIA continued
to develop covert plans aimed at the removal of Allende from office. Evidence of these orders is
seen in a secret cable, sent on the 16th of October 1970. CIA deputy director of plans, Thomas
Karamessines, conveys Kissinger's orders to CIA station chief in Santiago, Henry Hecksher:
"It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be
preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will
continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure
toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be
implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG (United States Government) and
American hand be well hidden."18
This secret cable was in essence, the green light to begin planning and implementation of future
Track II operations. The Republican party had given Truman the label of the President who lost
China to the Communists. Nixon was dead set on not giving the Democratic party any
opportunity to label him the next President to lose a country to communism. Because of this
Track II operations would continue.
Running concurrently with Track I, Track II operations had begun on September 9 and were
accelerated when Nixon’s directive of September 15th was issued. The approach was three
pronged. The first step was to identify, contact, and gather background information on any

Huggins
13

military officers who would be willing to participate in and execute the coup plan. The second
step was to inform them that the United States government was committed and they would
receive its full support short of sending in military forces. The final step was to create a climate
within Chile that provided an excuse for the Chilean military to overthrow Allende.19
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) military attaché in Chile was Colonel Paul Wimert.
He was used in this effort because he had established close ties with the Chilean military
including those who might support the coup. Wimert was advised to proceed with the
knowledge of the Ambassador. He accomplished his mission through the use of “false flaggers”
or the “illegal team,” an elite team of four special agents. These four operatives were chosen for
the experience and ability to pose as non-United States nationals, a means that safeguarded the
operation against exposure. False flag agents usually operated under deep cover, posing as Latin
Americans and were used to make contacts with individuals for whom the CIA had little or no
information, people who operated on the fringe, and whose reliability was unproven or unknown
to the CIA.
The CIA identified five possible military candidates to lead a coup against Allende. These
men were General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the garrison in Santiago de Chile, General
Joaquín García, second in command of the air force, General Vicente Huerta, commander of the
national police, Admiral Hugo Tirado, second in command of the navy, and retired General
Roberto Viaux.20 All of the officers were informed that the United States government would
support them before and after the coup took place. After contacting these and a number of other
active duty officers, Roberto Viaux was tabbed by the CIA to lead the coup. A CIA talking
paper notes that the “only one military leader of national stature, General Roberto Viaux, appears
committed to denying Allende the presidency.”21 Viaux was a disgruntled commander who had
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been retired for attempting a military coup in 1969 against Frei. Being retired he commanded no
troops, therefore the choice of Viaux was not without its own problems. Most active duty
officers would not move against the Allende government due in large part to their Commander in
Chief, General René Schneider. Following the tradition of the Chilean military, Schneider was
completely committed to a position of supporting the Constitutional transfer of power.
Furthermore, General Schneider publicly supported the transfer of power to whichever candidate
the Chilean congress would chose, including Salvador Allende.
Step three in Track II was an effort wherein the CIA, the United States embassy in Chile,
and the White House set out to disrupt the tranquility of the nation and create turmoil so a “coup
climate” would be created. This would create major challenges for the CIA and several
problems. Among these problems and challenges was the fact that a large segment of the
population was pleased and quite happy with the election of Salvador Allende. The second
problem was the tradition of the Chilean military to remain out of politics and support the
Constitution. The shining example of that was the CIA's third problem, General René Schneider.
Therefore it was imperative that General Schneider be removed from the equation. Before any
operation to remove General Schneider could be undertaken, the CIA needed to begin
establishing a coup climate or crisis. The primary objective of this socioeconomic crisis was to
force the military to take action against Allende, or for him to step down. To create a climate
that provided a pretext for the military to take action, and assist in creating a flashpoint for
action, the CIA used a three pronged attack: economic, political, and psychological warfare.
Economic warfare and pressure were always seen as key components of any coup strategy –
In the infamous words of President Nixon, he wanted “to make the economy scream."22 To
make this happen the CIA was tasked to determine what economic tactics could be employed.
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Actions considered included ideas such as starting rumors of food rationing to create hoarding
and shortages; asking United States banks to halt renewal of credit to Chile; have Chile based
United States companies halt or slow down critical items, such as spare machine parts for the
mining industry; spreading false information about near bankruptcy of Chilean building and loan
associations; pressuring United States companies to publically announce closure of their Chilean
operations; and numerous other tactics. International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and The
PepsiCo companies were already involved in United States government plans to stop Allende. In
addition, the CIA was pressuring European countries with economic ties to Chile to suspend or
slow down activities.
Political warfare accelerated propaganda and mobilization of CIA-controlled organizations
and assets. In an effort to isolate Allende’s Popular Unity Coalition, negative reports by
politicians and civic leaders, anti-Allende rallies, hostile media to include newspaper, radio, and
television, were financially supported and directed by the CIA. Fictitious intelligence reports
and false information about Allende’s plans, were circulated throughout the press and the
military, all with the intent of creating a climate and pretext for a coup.
A rumor campaign was started based on any possible bit of information that might help
create the coup climate. It was suggested that false flag officers should frequent bars and plant a
minimum of three rumors a day for ten days. The grist for the rumor mill would be provided by
the CIA. The CIA was ordered to consider the use of terrorist activities against Allende’s
followers. The CIA documents declassified by the Clinton administration do not contain enough
information to support the fact that terrorist activities were conducted in the effort to create the
coup climate. Given the world situation today and the United States' "war on terror" the words
“terrorist activities” have a rather profound impact. It shows another aspect of United States
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government hypocrisy in the fact that it would possibly encourage terrorist actions, yet
proclaimed displeasure with terrorist actions committed by others.
With the 24 October Chilean Congressional vote on the election winner looming, Kissinger
pressured the CIA to instigate a coup. Under this extreme pressure the CIA decided that the
solution for Track II would have to be a military action with retired General Viaux. Viaux was
contacted through a foreign intermediary on 5 October 1970. Two false flag agents, Anthony
Sforza and Bruce MacMasters, served as liaison with Viaux and his people and obtained details
on strategy and support requirements. In order for the Viaux operation to be successful, General
Schneider had to be neutralized. It was decided that Schneider would be kidnapped by the Viaux
organization and isolated to keep him from making any statements that would keep other military
officers from joining Viaux. It appeared to be a good plan since it removed a powerful Allende
supporter and would have him replaced with a Viaux coup supporter. Additionally, the plan
called for the kidnapping to be blamed on leftist extremists to undermine Allende’s integrity.
Sforza and MacMasters coordinated with members of Viaux's group to plan the kidnapping. As
the planning continued, Thomas Karamessines lost confidence in the ability of Viaux to
successfully lead a coup. In a meeting with Kissinger and Alexander Haig on 15 October 1970,
Karamessines voiced his concern and when he stated that it was the CIA's conclusion that "Viaux
did not have more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less-to launch a successful coup."23
Furthermore, all members of this meeting agreed that Viaux had to be warned against launching
a coup attempt at this time. To that end a message was sent to Viaux stating:
"We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the
conclusion that your plans for a coup cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce our
capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will
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come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have
our support."24
Despite the above quoted warning, the CIA continued to meet with and support Viaux. At 2:00
am on 22 October 1970, the CIA delivered three submachine guns to Viaux supporters. At
8:00am the next day, 23 October 1970, General Schneider's vehicle was struck and stopped by
five members of Viaux's team. Two members of the group broke the rear window, General
Schneider pulled his sidearm in an attempt to defend himself and several members of the kidnap
team fired. The severely wounded Schneider succumbed to his wounds three days later.25
The election of Allende to the Chilean presidency on 4 September 1970 was a moment that
created a wave of actions in Chile, Latin America, and Washington D.C.. Frantic and frequent
communications between Ambassador Korry and Washington became the norm. Despite the
efforts of the United States and the coup supporters, Salvador Allende was ratified as the
President of Chile on 24 October 1970. All seventy-four Christian Democrat Senators and
Congressmen voted for Allende. The fact that there was no “coup climate” in Chile became
painfully evident to the leadership of the United States government. The United States now had
to scramble to cover up their role in the efforts to keep Allende out of office. Nixon, Kissinger,
Helms, Korry, Mitchell, and the CIA had to keep the world from learning of their devious plans.
Orders were given to destroy evidence that could produce a trail back to the United States
government. The order included instructions to lie in response to any allegations of United
States involvement and to stick with absolute denial of the facts. The CIA fostered an
impression that all contact with General Viaux and his group were stopped before October 18.
By scrambling to cover up its role, the Nixon administration admitted that what it was doing was
wrong and in direct violation of the our own principles, values and rights.26
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After the Chilean congress approved Allende as their choice for President, President Nixon
still wanted to bring down Allende. Qureshi's thesis sums up Nixon's reasoning, "Truman had
lost China. Kennedy had lost Cuba. Nixon was not about to lose Chile."27 On 3 November 1970,
Salvador Allende was inaugurated as the new Chilean President. That same day the National
Security Council presented Kissinger with a 21 page options paper for Chile. This paper
described and presented the United States objectives, and interests as well as providing four
options, Options A, B, C, and D, towards Chile.28 On 9 November the National Security
Council informed the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Office of
Emergency Preparedness and the Director of Central Intelligence that United States policy
towards Chile would fall under Option C, cool but correct posture. These directives were issued
under National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93).29
Economic pressures initiated under project FUBELT continued after Allende's inauguration.
The first step in the economic effort to destabilize the Chilean government was to initiate what
was referred to as an invisible blockade. The Chilean economy was deeply dependent on
financial, industrial, and commercial relations with the United States. Two-thirds of the 1.6
billion dollar foreign investment in Chile was generated by United States businesses. Prior to
Eduardo Frei's Chileanization of copper, United States businesses owned eighty percent of the
Chilean copper industry. The United States government's invisible blockade, constituted total
economic war against the Allende regime. Chilean accounts in the United States were frozen,
new loans from banks were stopped or deferred, Chile's world credit rating was downgraded, and
European countries were encouraged to adopt the same policies. The United States pressured
European creditors to join them in refusing to reschedule Chile's debt. In terms of banking credit
alone, the Chilean economy took a massive body blow. World bank loans dropped from 31
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million to zero, Export-Import bank loans dropped from 280 million to zero, Inter-American
Development Bank loans dropped from 46 million to 2 million, and loans thru the United States
Agency for International development dropped from 110 million to 3 million. United States
corporations with assets in Chile were encouraged to drag their feet and limit their operations as
much as possible. A proposal was even considered to sell off the United States stockpile of
copper in order to drive down the price. Economic pressure was considered for the Chilean
military in the hopes that it would act against Allende. Postponement of a delivery of United
States tanks was considered and new sales of military aircraft were processed slowly. But in light
of the fact that the United States needed Chilean military cooperation for a coup, and in order to
maintain contacts within the Chilean military, sales of military equipment, military assistance
and training were actually doubled.30
The United States attempted to isolate Chile diplomatically. Brazil and Argentina were
consulted in efforts to try to remove Chile from the Organization of American States (OAS).
The very same initiative that the United States took against Cuba after Castro declared his
Marxist allegiance.
Economic and political destabilization were just two parts of a three part attack under NSDM
93. The United States budgeted seven million dollars for covert action programs for Chile. The
first aim was to exacerbate existing economic, political, governmental, and military tensions.
The second leg was to divide and weaken Allende. Activities undertaken to meet these
objectives were directed against the Allende coalition, Allende himself, the Chilean military, any
groups opposing Allende, the public and other Latin American countries. In a
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY summary for President Nixon, Kissinger listed the five
principal elements of the CIA covert destabilization plan to accomplish these goals.31
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Political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition and support to non-Marxist
political groups and parties were two of these five principals. Political operations included
financial support of Chilean opposition parties for the April 1971 elections. This included covert
financing of the Christian Democrat Party and the National Party and other smaller parties that
could well be a part of a coalition government. The CIA was aware of that the business
community was working to promote violent disorder to foment a coup.32 The business
community had formed a group called the gremios. The gremios were comprised of small and
large business owners, small farmers, transportation segments of the economy to include truck
and taxi drivers, and artisans in what was truly a multiclass organization. Historian Thomas
Wright argues that these groups banded together, "To counter the threat of reform," under the
banner of "commonality of interests among all merchants, from the major import-export houses
to the humble shopkeeper, all farmers, manufacturers, and professionals."33 While political
opponents were being financed and supported, the CIA looked towards maintaining and
enlarging its contacts in the Chilean military.
The Chilean military was the third element of the CIA destabilization plan. The CIA Realized
that the military was the key player in any effort to change Chile’s future, therefore, the CIA put
extreme emphasis on covert operations targeting the military. The emphasis was to rebuild the
covert assets within the military after the arrests and purges that took place after the assassination
of General Schneider. The deceptive operations were geared to convince the military generals
that Allende was plotting with Fidel Castro to undermine the army’s high command. This was
done, in part, through the use of an anti-Allende newsletter that targeted the military. In turn,
military officers who were strongly opposed to Allende made it known to the United States that
they would support a coup. It was during a visit to a United States military installation in
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Panama that one such officer, army commander General Augusto Pinochet, come to the
forefront. In a secret CIA cable from 27 September 1972 noted that, "Pinochet, previously the
strict Constitutionalist, reluctantly admitted he now harboring second thoughts: That Allende
must be forced to step down or be eliminated."34
The final elements of the CIA plan consisted of the assistance and use of selected media
outlets to speak out against Allende constituted the remaining two elements noted in the
Kissinger memorandum. The El Mercurio project was part of the CIA's plan to assist certain
periodicals which could speak out against the Allende government. The El Mercurio newspaper
was a key outlet for the massive propaganda campaign that was part of Track I and II. This was
an unyielding campaign of inflammatory articles and editorials exhorting the opposition and
calling for an overthrow of the Allende government. El Mercurio, in turn, received 1.95 million
dollars.35 As Peter Kornbluh notes, “In an admission that United States covert operations had
directly contributed to the overthrow of Allende, the CIA asserted that the propaganda effort, in
which El Mercurio was the dominant actor, played a significant role in setting the stage for the
military coup of September 11, 1973.”36 A role that proved to be far more effective than the
CIA's ability to influence elections via financial support of opposition groups.
In the spring of 1973 Congressional elections were held in Chile. Allende's UP coalition
gained two seats in the Senate and six seats in Congress, despite six million dollars pumped into
opposition group campaigns prior to the election. As a result of the elections the CIA refocused
its attention on creating a coup climate. Adding fuel to the CIA's desire to create a climate for a
coup was the fact that the Chilean military had indicated that they were ready to go with the coup
in July 1973. Once again the only thing standing in the way was the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. Much like General Schneider, General Carlos Prats the new Commander in

Huggins
22

Chief, was committed to upholding the Constitution and the traditional role of the Chilean
military refraining from action in politics. Because of this Prats was viewed as the only officer
impeding a coup attempt. Because of the assassination of General Schneider three years earlier,
the CIA wished to avoid a replay with General Plats. The plan undertaken by the CIA, was a
massive smear campaign through El Mercurio. The plan was very successful and lead to the
resignation of General Prats in late August.37 Thus on 11 September 1973 the coup was
launched and in the wake of this action Salvador Allende would be dead. Refusing to be
captured by the military, Allende committed suicide. The Chilean people now faced sixteen
years of extremely oppressive rule under the military leadership led by Augusto Pinochet.
Thomas Karamessines words help to sum up the effect of the CIA operations when he said
in 1975, “Track II never ended . What we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert,
and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievements and of the objectives of
Track II. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I
do not have any question about that in my mind."38 Karamessines' words also help to illustrate
the United State's transition to covert influence versus overt military actions that was the
hallmark of earlier foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth century.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, United States policy toward Latin America
was such that overt military actions to remove governments that were not in concert with United
States economic and political interests, were frequently authorized by United States Presidents.
After signing the U.N. Charter in 1948 that stressed nonintervention and respect for a nation’s
sovereignty, the use of the CIA to assert United States influence in countries all around the
globe, was used on a frequent basis. The opening salvo of American hypocrisy was United
States support of the French in reclaiming their colonies in Indochina after World War II.
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Hypocritical because of the words of the U.N. charter stating the rights of self determination, that
were also the heart and soul of its predecessor the Atlantic Charter.
On the Jim Lehrer PBS Online News Hour of 20 February 2001, former Chilean Foreign
Affairs Minister Juan Gabriel Valdes spoke for the Chilean government when he said, "It is
always shocking to learn again that the United States sent machine guns in the pouch of the U.S.
embassy in Chile to order the kidnap of the Commander in Chief of the Chilean armed forces.
And of course this is very important for us to know; and I think that the reaction of my
government at the time was, and still is, that we would like to see along with the papers a certain
sense of remorse." Later in the News Hours, Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying " This assumes
the policy was immoral or worse, and that I don't accept. It's easy to forget what the Cold War
was like. We thought, wrongly or rightly, we were in a life and death struggle with the Soviet
Union as a functioning global system."39 The Chilean people do not agree and this is just one of
the many reasons that the United States has such a terrible image among many of the nations in
Latin America. It is an image that is tarnished as a direct result of our own political hypocrisy,
the Cold War, and the desire of every President since Harry Truman to keep the United States in
the spotlight of the world stage as a superpower. The actions taken by the government of the
United States in its effort to "contain" the Soviet Union and the possible spread of communism
completely violated the U.N. charter. Countries around the world were allowed the right of selfdetermination, as long as the government that was established was one that was friendly to the
United States. Governments with even the least bit of a leftward lean were undermined either
covertly or overtly in order to establish a more "friendly" government, never mind if the
government that was in power was doing well for its people and the welfare of its own
sovereignty.
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As the history of past events begins to outlive its participants, more and more government
documents are being declassified and released. For many events there remains a need to balance
national security and the safety and reputations of those involved, against the desires of the
public and historians to have access to what the government knows. Events like the
assassination of President Kennedy, Roswell, and the Cuban Missile Crisis may never see their
government sources and documents released. In the study and research of history, primary
source evidence, like declassified government documents are playing a larger role in the
evolution and truth of all studies of past subjects. In the case of my research, it played a valuable
role in setting the record straight on U.S. involvement. It may also open the doors for possible
legal actions against those involved, similar to Spain's attempt to prosecute Allende's
replacement, General Augusto Pinochet, for crimes against humanity. Although declassification
and release of government documents has provided a better understanding, by the public and
scholars, of historical events, it appears to have done little to change government policy. United
States interventions have led either directly or indirectly to the loss of life of thousands of people
in Cuba, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, South Korea, Vietnam, and most
recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. This paper has shown just one of those examples. Perhaps
current attitudes towards the United States today are a direct result of political, economic and
military interventions in the name of freedom and democracy. But that is something for another
paper, some other time.
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National Security Council, Chile, November 6 (1970). Available from: The National Security
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Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18 (1970). Available from: The

Huggins
26

National Security Archive at The George Washington University; Department of Defense, U.S.
Milgroup, Situation Report #2, October 1 (1973). Available from: The National Security Archive
at The George Washington University; Department of State Memorandum, (1970). Available
from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; Department of State
Cables, (1970). Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington
University; National Security Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97), November 3 (1970).
Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; National
Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93, Policy Towards Chile, November
9 (1970). Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University;
Transcript of Telephone Conversation between H. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers (1970).
Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University;
Transcript of Telephone Conversation between H. Kissinger and President Nixon (1970).
Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University.
2. Charter of the United Nations, (2010).
3. The theory of containment first came into being through the Long Telegram written by
George Kennan, counselor at the Moscow embassy. In the telegram Kennan points out the
ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, Kennan
argued that the Soviet Union would look out for itself and "that it would work to destroy our
traditional way of life."3 Kennan's solution was that if the willingness to use force was made
apparent, the Soviet Union would back down. Later in1947 Kennan wrote an article under the
pseudonym "X" in which he argued for "a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the
Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching
upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."3 Hand in hand with the containment policy
was the domino theory. The domino theory is the belief that if a given country in any given
region were to fall to communism, the other countries in that region would soon follow, one right
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Greece and Turkey in their fight against communism, Harry S. Truman formally announced what
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